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COPYRIGHT LAW-GRAY MARKETING-THE FIRST SALE
DOCTRINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW CLOSES ANOTHER
AVENUE OF REDRESS*
Sebastian International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd. (1988)
"Gray marketing" (or "parallel importation") occurs when a com-
pany, other than the manufacturer's authorized distributor, purchases
that manufacturer's products outside the United States and imports
them into this country. The importer then directly competes with the
authorized distributor.I Generally, because the manufacturers set lower
selling prices for their export goods, independent, unauthorized distrib-
utors are able to sell the goods in the United States at rates substantially
below the authorized distributor's prices. 2 Products sold on the gray
market include those manufactured abroad under authorized licensing
agreements and then purchased and imported by unauthorized distribu-
tors. They also include those manufactured domestically, exported
overseas and then purchased and reimported into the United States by
unauthorized distributors. 3 Gray marketing poses a serious problem to
both domestic manufacturers and authorized distributors. 4
Copyright laws provide one possible source of relief against gray
marketing of copyrighted goods. The general purpose of copyright law
is to give the public maximum access to an author's work while, at the
same time, granting the author a limited monopoly in order to en-
* This casebrief has won First Prize in the 1989 Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition at Villanova University School of Law, and has been entered in the
National Competition.
1. Gorelick & Little, The Case for Parallel Importation, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
CoM. REG. 205, 206 (1986). It should be noted that there is nothing inherently
illegal about this practice, although the term "gray market" might suggest other-
wise. The goods purchased are authentic and are purchased for whatever price
the manufacturer is asking in the foreign market. Id. at 207.
2. See Donohue, The Use of Copyright Laws to Prevent the Importation of "Gemline
Goods," II N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 183, 183-84 (1986). Aside from the
currency considerations, products offered for sale to markets outside the coun-
try are generally sold at much lower prices than the same goods for sale in the
domestic market. Id. Thus, almost any product which has bypassed the domes-
tic distribution chain will be available at lower pricing regardless of the value of
the dollar to the foreign currency.
3. See Brief for The Coalition for Competitive Imports as Amicus Curiae at
2, Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir.
1988) (No. 87-5439).
4. It has been estimated that "[t]he retailers of parallel imports are respon-
sible for total consumer sales of $100 billion a year." Id. at 4. See also Kersner &
Stein, Judicial Construction of Section 526 and the Importation of Grey Mlarket Goods.
From Tobtal Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry, 11 N.C.j. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 251, 251
(1986) (noting dramatic increase in number of imports of gray market goods).
(597)
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courage and reward creative work. 5 Three sections of the Copyright
Act'! combine to provide potential relief from gray marketing. Section
106 of the Act grants exclusive rights to the owner of the copyright,
including the right to distribute copies of the copyrighted work. 7 How-
ever, this distribution right is limited by section 109 of the Act, which
restricts the right to control the copyrighted work once an authorized
transfer of that copy has occurred. 8 This restriction, known as the "first
sale doctrine," limits the conferred distribution right once the original
owner has consented to the sale of a particular copy.!' Finally, section
602 of the Act protects an original copyright holder against unauthor-
ized importation of copies.' 0 Thus, a copyright holder is limited in his
exclusive distribution rights by making a first sale and is protected
against unauthorized importation of copies.
In the gray marketing situation, two of these three provisions con-
flict and must be reconciled. ' Section 109(a) limits the exclusive distri-
5. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)(referring to important public purpose achieved by limited grant of monopoly
privileges); see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (noting that "en-
couragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare").
6. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)(repealing Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075).
7. Id. § 106. Section 106 provides in pertinent part: "Subject to sections
107 through 118, the owner of copyright.., has the exclusive rights ... (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; . . . [and] (3) to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership . I..." Id
8. Id. § 109(a). Section 109(a) provides in pertinent part: "Notwithstand-
ing the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully
made under this title ... is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy .... Id. The
legislative intent in enacting this section was to limit the monopoly given to the
author through his exclusive right to distribute as granted in § 106. H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5659, 5693-95. It foreclosed the continuing control over disposition of
copies once ownership has been transferred. Id.
9. See 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12[B][1], at 8-120.10(1988) ("It is clear that once the copyright owner consents to the sale of particu-
lar copies . . .of his work, he may not thereafter exercise the distribution right
with respect to such copies ....").
10. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a). Section 602(a) provides in pertinent part: "Impor-
tation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright
under this title, of copies ...of a work that have been acquired outside the
United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies ...
under section 106 .... Id. There was no counterpart to § 602(a) prior to the
Copyright Act of 1976, so the legislative history of this provision is sparse. For a
complete discussion of the background surrounding this legislation, see Tyson
& Parker, Parallel Importation f Copyrighted Phonorecords, 10 N.C.J. IN'rl I. & COM.
RE;. 397, 402-06 (1985).
11. See Tyson & Parker, supra note 10, at 398 ("ITIhe application of section
109(a) produces a result diametrically opposite from that mandated by the literal
terms of section 602(a).").
598 [Vol. 34: p. 597
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bution rights granted under section 106, and section 602(a) extends
these riights. The ambiguous language of section 602(a) gives rise to
this conflict by stating that the unauthorized importer infringes upon
"the exclusive right to distribute copies . . .under section 106 .... " 2
This may be read as incorporating section 602(a) into section 106, thus
creating an additional exclusive right-the right to control imports.' 3
Under this interpretation, the first sale doctrine does not apply when
goods are acquired outside the United States, and thus the importation
prohibition is not restricted. Alternatively, section 602(a) may be read
as limiting the right to control imports to those situations where an in-
dependent section 106 right already exists and has not been extinguished
by a first sale.14 Under this interpretation, the first sale doctrine applies
to all copyrights, and thus upon the first sale, the importation prohibi-
tion is extinguished along with the other exclusive rights. In Sebastian
International, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd.,15 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was presented with the opportu-
nity to reconcile these provisions of the Copyright Act against the back-
drop of gray market importation.
Sebastian International (Sebastian), a California corporation, en-
tered into an oral contract with Consumer Contacts (d/b/a 3-D Market-
ing Services) (3-D), a South African company, to have 3-D distribute
Sebastian's hair care products only to beauty salons in South Africa. '"
Pursuant to this agreement, Sebastian shipped four containers of its hair
care products to 3-D in South Africa in January, 1987.17 3-D did not
open these containers, but sold them to defendant Fabric Ltd. (Fabric),
who reshipped them to the United States. 18 Sebastian then sought a
restraining order based on breach of contract to stop Fabric and several
other distributors from distributing the products in the United States. ',
The district court granted the temporary restraining order and sched-
uled a hearing. 2°) The plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint to
allege a copyright violation against Fabric under section 602 of the
Copyright Act. 2 ' After it became apparent that the plaintiff could not
show that defendant Fabric had the requisite knowledge of the contrac-
tual limitations placed upon 3-D, the breach of contract claim was dis-
missed against Fabric.22 The district court then lifted the restraining
12. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a).
13. Tyson & Parker, supra note 10, at 403.
14. Id.
15. 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
16. Id. at 1094.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1094-95.
20. Id. at 1095.
21. Id.
22. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp.
909, 911 (D.N.J. 1987), reV W, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). The knowledge
1989] 599
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order, but simultaneously imposed a preliminary injunction based on
the copyright infringement claim, finding that two labels of the products
in question had been properly registered and, therefore, fell within the
copyright protections.2 3
In imposing the injunction on the defendants, the district court held
that the importation provision of section 602(a) was not restricted by the
first sale doctrine, adopting the interpretation that section 602(a) cre-
ated a distribution right in addition to those granted by section 106.24
The defendants then appealed to the Third Circuit claiming that the dis-
trict court had incorrectly interpreted section 602(a) and that the first
sale doctrine precluded any copyright infringement claim. 2 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, with
Judge Weis writing for a unanimous panel,2 6 vacated the district court's
order granting a preliminary injunction.2 7 The Third Circuit held that
once a copyright holder transfers ownership of any copies, the first sale
doctrine extinguishes any distribution rights, including importation
rights, over those copies. 28
The Third Circuit began its analysis by looking at the purposes of
the copyright laws.2 9 The court noted the monopoly privileges of the
Copyright Act "promote an important public purpose by encouraging
requirement of a contract claim against gray marketers was defined by the Third
Circuit in Johnson &Johnson Prod. v. DAL Int'l Trading Co., 798 F.2d 100 (3d
Cir. 1986). Under a contract theory, the plaintiff must establish that the holder
of the gray market goods had actual knowledge of the contractual limitations
imposed on the original buyer. Id. at 106.
23. Sebastian, 664 F. Supp. at 912-13. The exact text on the label read:
Hair stays wet-looking as long as you like. Brushes out to full-bodied
dry look. WET 4 as one step-four choice (finishing) in Sebastian's four
step program for a healthy scalp and head of hair. WET is not oily,
won't flake and keeps hair wet-looking for hours, allowing you to sculp-
ture, contour, wave or curl. It stays looking wet until it's brushed out.
When brushed, hair looks and feels thicker, extra full. Try brushing
partly, leaving some parts wet for a different look.
Id. at 913. The district court addressed the question of whether this text was
copyrightable and stated: "While this text tries the limits of the modicum of
creativity necessary for a work to be copyrightable.... as a whole it comes within
the purview of the Copyright Act." Id.
24. Id. at 920.
25. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1095. The defendant also claimed that the plain-
tiff had not shown irreparable harm in its request for the restraining order. Id.
The Third Circuit did not discuss this issue.
26. Id. at 1094. Judge Weis was joined in his opinion by ChiefJudge Gib-
bons and Judge Greenberg.
27. Id. at 1099. The court remanded the case for disposition of the remain-
ing issues. Id.
28. Id. The court stated: "We differ ... with the district court's finding of
infringement because, in our view, a first sale by the copyright owner extin-
guishes any right later to control importation of those copies." Id.
29. Id. at 1095. The court noted that the Copyright Act is based on the
United States Constitution, article I, § 8, which authorizes Congress to grant
authors and inventors monopoly privileges for limited lime periods. Id.
600 [Vol. 34: p. 597
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the creative activity of authors and by allowing public access to 'the
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.' ,,31 The court noted, however, that the copyright laws have
attempted to achieve a proper balance between the interest in the free
flow of creative products and the authors' interests in controlling the
exploitation of their writings. 3 1 Section 109(a), the first sale doctrine,
lies on one side of the balancing scale and section 602(a), the importa-
tion prohibition, lies on the other.
In analyzing the purposes of section 109(a), the court looked to the
report of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 32 The report, describing the
scope of section 109(a), stated that once the transfer of a copy occurs,
the owner's exclusive right of distribution no longer runs to that copy. 33
The court then briefly discussed two considerations underlying the first
sale doctrine. 34 First, the court identified section 109(a) as a codifica-
tion of the common law principles against restraints on alienation of
personal property. 3 5 Second, the court noted the financial considera-
tions behind the doctrine, reasoning that once a transfer or sale has oc-
curred, the original copyright owner has received his reward for the use
of the copyrighted article. 36
The Third Circuit next discussed the purposes and intent behind
section 602(a), the importation clause, noting that it was intended to
30. Id. (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,
429 (1984)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1096 (citing S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1974),
reprinted in 13 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1977)). See
also supra note 8 and accompanying text. Prior to its examination of this report,
the court traced the lineage of the first sale doctrine back to Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1096. In Bobbs-Memill, the
Supreme Court established that a copyright holder's right of exclusive sale did
not enable the holder to restrict future resales of the item. Id. (citing Bobbs-
Merrill, 210 U.S. at 350).
33. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1096 (citing S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
131 (1974), reprinted in 13 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
(1977)).
34. Id.
35. Id. See also 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8.12, at 8-120.9 ("[T]he policy
favoring a copyright monopoly for authors gives way to the policy opposing re-
straints of trade and restraints on alienation.").
36. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1096-97 (citing Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Ar-
row Drug, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964)); see also Cosmair, Inc. v.
Dynamite Enter., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985). The Cosmair court,
denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, noted that the plaintiffs
had not established that they would suffer irreparable harm by such denial, stat-
ing: "The Plaintiffs have already received their profits on the products from the
sale to the original purchase [sic]." Id. at 348. Accord Tyson & Parker, supra note
10, at 401 ("Once the copyright owner reaps a profit from the disposition of
copies of a work, the distribution privilege lapses as to those copies.").
Although the Sebastian court noted that financial reward is generally considered
of secondary importance in copyright law, it is a factor that must be considered
in analyzing the first sale doctrine. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1095.
1989]
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cover two paradigmatic situations.3 7 These situations are: 1) the impor-
tation of piratical copies (those made without the authority of the copy-,
right owner); and 2) the importation of lawfully made copies without
authorization.
3 8
The court then addressed the two possible interpretations of sec-
tion 602(a).39 As discussed above, one interpretation is that section
602(a) grants an additional right to copyright owners, the right of im-
portation control, which is not subject to the limitations of the first sale
doctrine. 4 °) The second interpretation is that section 602(a) is not a sep-
arate and distinct right, "but serves only as a specific example of those
rights subject still to the first sale limitation."' 4 1 Under this view, the
importation right falls under the distribution rights granted by section
106(3) and is subject to the limitations of section 109(a). 42 The court
noted that the legislative record gives no guidance in deciding which
interpretation should prevail. 43
To aid in the resolution of this conflict, the Third Circuit focused
on three decisions of the district courts and the problems presented by
each. 4 4 In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Scorpio Music Distributors,45 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held
that there was a copyright infringement under section 602(a) when cop-
ies of phonorecords produced in the Philippines were imported into the
United States without the consent of the original copyright owner. 46
37. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1097 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 169, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5785).
38. Id. The piratical copy situation was not presented by this case and was
not discussed by the court. Id.
39. Id. For further discussion of these two interpretations, see supra notes
13-14 and accompanying text.
40. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1097 (explaining that district court adopted this
view).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court noted that neither interpretation is "conclusively sup-
ported by the statutory language or legislative history." Id.; see also Tyson &
Parker, supra note 10, at 403 ("The history of section 602(a) provides little gui-
dance for solving this problem."); Note, Parallel Importing Under the Copyright Act of
1976, 17 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 113, 138 (1984) ("It is difficult to determine
Congressional intent with respect to [§ 602].").
44. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1098.
45. 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), af'd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d
Cir. 1984). In Scorpio, CBS-Sony, a Japanese corporation, entered into an agree-
ment with a Philippine manufacturer to produce and distribute records in the
Philippines only. Id. at 47. Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), the U.S.
copyright holder, authorized the agreement and retained the copyrights in the
United States. Id. Just prior to the termination of the agreement between CBS-
Sony and the Philippine distributor, defendant Scorpio placed an order to
purchase records from International Traders, a U.S. corporation. CBS sued
Scorpio because the records in question were purchased from the Philippine
corporation. Id.
46. Id. at 50.
602 [Vol. 34: p. 597
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The Scorpio court focused on the "lawfully made under this title" lan-
guage of section 109(a) and held that the first sale doctrine did not limit
the importation right.4 7 The court interpreted those words as providing
copyright protection only to buyers of copies which have been manufac-
tured and sold within the United States, and noted that the protection of
the copyright laws does not "extend beyond the borders of this country
unless the Code expressly states."'4 8 Thus, the Scorpio court adopted the
first interpretation of the copyright laws and held that where goods were
manufactured and sold outside the United States, the first sale doctrine
did not extinguish exclusive distribution rights.4 9
The Third Circuit next referred to TB. Harms Co. v. Jem Records,
Inc.,50 a case in which the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey held that a compulsory licensing requirement under section
115 of the Copyright Act did not extinguish or limit any exclusive distri-
bution rights. 5 1 The compulsory licensing regulation allows an artist to
use a copyrighted musical work in exchange for a payment of royalty,
and is a limitation on the copyright owner's monopoly. 52 The Harms
court analogized the compulsory licensing regulation to the first sale
doctrine, and held that section 602(a) was not limited by the compulsory
licensing provision. 53 The Harms court pointed to the similarities be-
tween this case and the Scorpio case and agreed with the reasoning and
reconciliation of the provisions adopted by the Scorpio court. 54
47. Id. at 49.
48. Id. The district court interpreted the language of § 109(a) as granting
first sale protection to third party buyers "of copies which have been legally
manufactured and sold within the United States and not to purchasers of im-
ports such as are involved here." Id. The court also thought that construing
§ 109(a) as limiting the importation right under "the more recently enacted
§ 602(a) would render § 602 virtually meaningless." Id.
49. Id. For a complete discussion of Scorpio, see Note, supra note 43.
50. 655 F. Supp. 1575 (D.N.J. 1987). In Harms, defendantJem, a U.S. dis-
tributor of records, imported, sold and distributed copies of a recording lawfully
produced in New Zealand without the consent of Harms, the valid copyright
owner in the United States. Id. at 1577.
51. Id. at 1583. The Harms court agreed that allowing the defendant to
limit the copyright holder's exclusive rights would render § 602 "virtually mean-
ingless." Id. (quoting Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 49-50).
52. Tyson & Parker, supra note 10, at 406 n.40 (referring to use of "Happy
Birthday to You" in television and films as example); see also 2 M. NIMMER, supra
note 9, § 8.04[A], at 8-53 (noting that exclusive right of reproduction granted to
copyright owner is modified by § 115 compulsory license regulation).
53. Harms, 655 F. Supp. at 1582-83. The court stated that "[tlhe present
case is clearly analogous to [Scorpio]" and found the only difference between the
two cases was the fact that the "parties relied on different limitations on the
owners' exclusive right of distribution." Id.
54. Id. The court stated that "[hiere, as in [Scorpio], to allow the defendant
to rely on a limitation of the owner's exclusive rights to circumvent the prohibi-
tion on importation would tie the hands of the copyright holder who seeks to
exercise his rights to control copies of the work which enter the American mar-
ket." Id. at 1583.
19891 603
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The third case that the Sebastian court analyzed was Hearst Corp. v.
Stark. 55 In Hearst, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California followed the reasoning of the Scopio court and held
that the first sale doctrine did not limit the application of section 602(a)
where goods manufactured outside the United States were imported
without authorization. 51 However, in Hearst, the court based much of its
decision on the precise wording of section 109(a), which refers to the
resale of "a particular copy," and held that the first sale doctrine did not
protect the wholesale distribution of multiple copies. 5 7 The court
stated: "Even if section 109 did permit [the sale of] a particular copy of
a copyrighted work, that section would not authorize the wholesale im-
portation and redistribution of multiple copyrighted works in conflict
with section 602. The singular language of section 109 contrasts with
the pluralistic language of section 602, which refers to importation, cop-
ies, and distribution." 58
The Sebastian court acknowledged that the district court cases are
not binding upon the Third Circuit, but it chose to distinguish them
from the instant case.59 The court noted that all of these cases involved
the protection that section 109(a) affords (or does not afford) an im-
porter when the goods are manufactured outside the United States.
60
In Sebastian, the goods were manufactured in the United States, distin-
guishing it from the previous decisions in that there was no question in
this case that the goods were "lawfully made under this title." 6 '
The Third Circuit then reasoned that section 602(a) does not create
a separate right in addition to those conferred by section 106(3). The
55. 639 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1986). In Hearst, the defendant imported
eighteen titles of books into the United States which were manufactured in Eng-
land by the owner of the copyright in England. Id. at 972. This importation was
done without the consent of the plaintiff, the owner of the copyright in the
United States. Id.
56. Id. at 977.
57. Id. at 976. This reasoning has been questioned by commentators. See 2
M. NIMMER, supra note 9, § 8.12[B], at 8-130.2 (criticizing Hearst decision be-
cause it "would allow importation of a single copy ... but would bar large-scale
importations").
58. Hearst, 639 F. Supp. at 976.
59. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1098 (noting that cases discussed "demonstrate a
significant difference from the factual situation presented here").
60. Id.
61. Id. (noting simplicity of this case because it "centers on actual copies of
labels printed in this country by the copyright owner"). Under any interpreta-
tion, products manufactured in the United States are "lawfully made" within the
meaning of § 109(a) and subject to all of the copyright laws, including the first
sale doctrine. See Tyson & Parker, supra note 10, at 402 ("Thus, the only limits
to the first sale doctrine within the express terms of the provision are that the
person in possession of the [copy] must be an owner, and the [copy] may not be
piratical i.e., that it must have been acquired in a lawful manner.").
The Third Circuit opted not to comment on the interpretation of § 109(a)
when applied to goods manufactured overseas. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1098.
.604 [Vol. 34: p. 597
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court therefore concluded that because section 106(3) is limited by the
first sale doctrine, the importation right created by section 602(a) is nec-
essarily limited by the first sale doctrine as well. 62
In reconciling the two apparently conflicting provisions of copyright
law, the Third Circuit avoided many of the problems that have plagued
courts that have adopted contrary interpretations. 'One such problem
has been the interpretation of the language "lawfully made under this
title" in section 109(a). The issue presented by this language is whether
the first sale defense is available to protect unauthorized importers of
products manufactured outside the United States. The court in Scorpio
determined that this language only granted first sale protection to third
party buyers of products "which have been legally manufactured and
sold within the United States."' 63 That court, however, did not decide
the precise issue of how section 109(a) reconciles with section 602(a)
when the goods are manufactured in the United States and reimported
by an unauthorized distributor.6 4
The Hearst court adopted Scorpio's analysis that "lawfully made
under this title" applies only to goods manufactured in the United
States, and, therefore, concluded that "[w]hile the 'first sale' defense re-
mains in certain factual circumstances, it provides no defense to defend-
ants for their importations here." 65 Based on the Scorpio rationale, the
Hearst court held that the first sale doctrine did not apply to the defend-
ants. In addition, the court provided alternative grounds for its holding.
The alternative rationale involved further interpretation of section
109(a). 66 By looking at the precise language of that section, the court
determined that even if section 109(a) did limit section 602, the limita-
tion would only be applicable to a "particular copy" of a work, and not
to wholesale importation as was involved in Hearst.6 7 The Third Circuit
in Sebastian avoided this problem by confining its decision to the facts
involved-where products are manufactured in the United States.68
Another problem posed by the Scorpio court's interpretation of the
language "lawfully made under this title" is that courts would have to
determine not only the place of manufacture, but also where title
62. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099 (stating simply that "a first sale by the copy-
right owner extinguishes any right later to control importation of those copies").
63. Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 49.
64. Id. The court noted that the defendant's contentions that the first sale
doctrine protected any unauthorized importation would have been far more per-
suasive without the limiting language of § 109(a). Id.
65. Hearst, 639 F. Supp. at 977.
66. Id. at 976.
67. Id. The court stated: "Section 109 only applies to the resale of 'a par-
ticular copy' of a work. Here, defendants are importing large quantities of titles
.... Id.
68. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1098 (court specifically refused to pass upon dis-
trict courts' interpretations of "lawfully made under this title" language of
§ 109(a)).
1989] 605
9
Congdon: Copyright Law - Gray Marketing - The First Sale Doctrine of Copyr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
passed, in order to establish that the goods had been sold in the United
States. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida addressed this issue in Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enterprises, Inc.,"61
stating that it was impossible to determine whether the first sale doctrine
applied because the place of sale could not be established. 70 By not
focusing on the place of manufacture or sale, the Third Circuit avoided
this problem. 7 1
A more fundamental problem, however, is whether the issue of gray
marketing should be addressed through narrow application of the copy-
right laws. 72 There are various theories under which an aggrieved man-
ufacturer could seek redress for the unauthorized importation of its
products. 7 3 Because the real harm to the manufacturer flows from the
distribution of the goods into the United States market, the remedy
most often sought under any theory of recovery is an injunction.7 4
Therefore, the desirability of a particular theory will depend in part on
whether it allows for injunctive relief.
One theory for restraining the unauthorized importation of goods is
breach of contract. This arises where the manufacturer sells its products
based on representations by the buyer that the goods are for sale in a
particular territory outside the United States. Once the buyer resells
those products outside of that exclusive territory, he has breached his
contract with the manufacturer. 75 The Third Circuit rejected this theory
in Johnson &Johnson Products, Inc. v. DAL International Trading Co.,76 refus-
ing to grant injunctive relief where the holder of the goods did not have
actual knowledge of the contractual limitations. In Johnson &Johnson, the
court held that the manufacturer was not entitled to injunctive relief be-
cause a purchaser in good faith does not have a duty to inquire into the
69. 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
70. Id. at 346-47. In this case it was not easily discernable where title had
passed. The court was uncertain as to whether a provision of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code or the parties' intent should control. Id.
71. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099. The Sebastian court concluded: "Conse-
quently, we agree with the district court that the place of sale is not the critical
factor in determining whether section 602(a) governs." Id.
72. Id. The Sebastian court specifically noted that while its decision was
predicated on copyright law, the underlying dispute of gray marketing was dom-
inant. Id. Because the court felt that this issue was important enough to men-
tion, gray marketing concerns were undoubtedly a strong factor motivating the
Third Circuit to reach its outcome.
73. See generally Turner, Grey Market Litigation in the United States District
Courts, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 349 (1986). In addition to trademark and
copyright actions, there are also possible fraud and RICO remedies available.
Id. 74. See id. at 361 ("[T]he most effective device to halt the flow of grey goods
is a preliminary injunction.").
75. SeeJohnson &Johnson Prod. v. DAL Int'l Trading Co., 798 F.2d 100,
103 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1986).
76. 798 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
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validity of the title absent any knowledge of fraud.7 7 Thus, there is no
contractual remedy to stop a third party purchaser from importing and
distributing gray market goods. 78
Another theory which manufacturers have attempted to use is
trademark violation. 79 Trademark law prohibits the importation into
the United States of goods manufactured abroad that bear the properly
registered trademark of a citizen or corporation of the United States."
Because this prohibition is limited to goods produced overseas, trade-
mark law will not be an available avenue for relief where the goods sold
on the gray market were manufactured in the United States, exported
and then re-imported, as in the Sebastian case.
Additionally, the viability of a trademark violation claim was se-
verely limited by the Supreme Court's recent decision in K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier.8 1 In K Mart, the Court upheld customs regulations which al-
lowed the parallel importation of products by persons other than the
owner of the registered trademark.8 2 Because K Mart held that trade-
mark law does not prohibit gray marketing of foreign-made products,
one commentator has suggested that, in the right situation, copyright
law "may provide the most effective relief against unwanted imports."8
Thus, a principal avenue that remains open to copyright holders
seeking protection from gray marketing is the Copyright Act. The ques-
tion that must be resolved is whether the Act is the proper hook upon
which to hang the perceived injustices of gray marketing. The Third
Circuit in Sebastian held that copyright law is not the solution to gray
marketing, and it is submitted that the decision in Sebastian was correct.
If copyright law is used in this expansive manner, several problems
will ensue. Under copyright law, it is not necessary to register a copy-
right in order to own the rights to that copy; however, registration is a
prerequisite to bringing a copyright infringement action against a viola-
77. Id. at 106.
78. See Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099. The court explained that domestic man-
ufacturers attempt to gain protection of their economic interests through copy-
right laws because contractual remedies have proved inadequate. Id.
79. See generally Turner, supra note 73, at 350-60.
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
81. 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988).
82. Id. at 1819. The Court described three situations in which parallel im-
portation can arise under trademark law: 1) a domestic firm purchases a trade-
mark for use in the United States from a foreign firm, which then sells the
trademarked products in the United States itself or through a third party; 2) a
parent, subsidiary or the foreign firm itself registers the trademark and then the
foreign firm imports identical products; and 3) a domestic holder of a trademark
authorizes its use by a foreign firm for a particular overseas market, and that
foreign firm then imports the trademarked goods into the United States. Id. at
1814-15. The Court allowed the regulation to stand as it applied to the first two
categories but not the third. Id. at 1819.
83. Palladino, High Court Duo on Discounters: Legal Fog Still Shrouds 'Gray-Mar-
ket' Goods, vii Legal Times, June 20, 1988, at 19, col. 1.
1989]
11
Congdon: Copyright Law - Gray Marketing - The First Sale Doctrine of Copyr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
tor.8 4 Thus, the ability to invoke the Copyright Act in a case of gray
marketing may hinge on registration as it did in Sebastian. The lower
court in Sebastian allowed an action to be brought only as it applied to
two products that were being imported because the other products had
not been registered. 8 5 Additionally, there will be questions as to
whether the products or parts of the products are even copyrightable in
the first place. 86 This question arose in Sebastian, where the copyright
claimed was the text on the back of hair care products. 8 7 The Third
Circuit referred to this as superficial targeting of a dispute over a prod-
uct's label when in reality the dispute raged over the product itself.8 8 If
copyright laws continue to be used to prevent gray marketing, manufac-
turers will find themselves stretching to find any work in their products
which is copyrightable, and will make sure that such work is registered in
order to bring potential future infringement claims. As the Third Cir-
cuit pointed out, this is not a proper use of the copyright laws. 89
The Third Circuit suggested in Sebastian that the problems of gray
marketing should be handled by Congress, and not by judicial extension
of a limited area of law.90 It is submitted that this approach is the
proper one. It is also suggested that some of the problems of gray mar-
ket importation may be tackled by the manufacturers themselves. Most
domestic manufacturers offer their products at substantially reduced
rates for sale abroad. 9 1 This is evidenced by the mere existence of gray
market goods. In situations such as Sebastian, where products are manu-
factured in the United States, sold overseas, and then imported back
into the United States, manufacturers could raise their overseas prices to
make gray marketing economically unfeasible. If the economic harm to
the manufacturers arising from the gray marketing of their goods were
84. Turner, supra note 73, at 361.
85. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp.
909, 912 (D.N.J. 1987), rev'd, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
86. See Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enter., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla.
1985). In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the court ex-
pressed concern about the validity of the copyright of a design on a bottle of
perfume. Id. at 347-48.
87. Sebastian, 664 F. Supp. at 913. For the exact text of the labels in ques-
tion, see supra note 23.
88. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099 (noting that closure of contractual remedies
in gray market disputes has caused manufacturers to turn to copyright law, cre-
ating anomalous situation).
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Kelly, An Overview of the Influx of Grey Market Goods Into the
United States, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 231, 250 (1986) ("Congress [needs]
to reaffirm the statutory framework that permits parallel imports under all the
laws of the United States."); Palladino, supra note 83, at 20.
91. See Brief for The Coalition for Competitive Imports as Amicus Curiae at
2-3, Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-5439); see also Donohue, supra note 2, at 183-84 (listing rea-
sons for price differential between goods intended for domestic market and
goods intended for sale overseas).
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substantial, then they would be forced to take the risk of losing some
legitimate overseas sales in order to combat gray marketing.
In the absence of congressional action, the copyright laws should
not be construed as a mechanism to prevent gray marketing. The pur-
pose of the copyright laws is to protect the exploitation of creative ideas
and works. 9 2 Once a copyright owner has received his reward for that
work he should not be allowed to control its further distribution" : In
order to use the copyright laws to prevent gray marketing, the courts
must give a stilted construction to the laws and read out the intent of an
entire provision (section 109). Courts cannot be required to give a read-
ing to the laws that circumvents the purpose and intent of the overall
legislative scheme.
The Third Circuit in deciding Sebastian did not pass judgment on
gray marketing-it did not decide whether the public's right to lower-
priced products outweighed the harm to the copyright owners. But the
court did reconcile the two conflicting interpretations of the copyright
laws in a manner consistent with the underlying policy against stretching
the Copyright Act's "limited monopoly" to cover a broad problem.11
4
Gray marketing should be addressed through fraud, contract or trade-
mark claims. It is far too tenuous to hold importers liable for an in-
fringement of a copyright predicated on the wording of a label.
Julie S. Congdon
92. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984); see also Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1095.
93. See Tyson & Parker, supra note 10, at 410.
94. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099.
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